【论文信息】

Yang B（杨柏）, Wang T^*（王藤潘）, Pan N, et al. Government policy incentives: Premium subsidy and risk compensation in credit guarantees[J]. International Journal of Production Economics（ABS 3星、中科院SCI一区Top期刊）, 2027, 303: 110227.

【作者信息】

第一作者：杨柏，教授、博士、博士生导师，研究方向：企业转型与组织管理、跨国企业经营及管理；

第二作者/通讯作者：王藤潘，杨柏教授指导的2023级硕士研究生，研究方向：企业管理。

【论文摘要】

In the manufacturing sector, micro and small enterprises (MSEs), which are generally associated with higher default risk, often rely on credit guarantee institutions (CGIs) to obtain bank financing. However, as CGIs have limited risk-bearing capacity, they are generally reluctant to provide guarantees for these MSEs. To encourage CGIs’ participation in MSE financing, governments typically implement two subsidy policies: premium subsidy, which subsidizes part of CGIs’ guarantee fee income, and risk compensation, which compensates CGIs for part of their compensation loss. We formulate a game-theoretic model to analyze how these two policies affect the decisions and profits of a firm and a CGI, and to examine how a government should choose between them. We find that, under the same subsidy rate, both policies improve the firm’s access to guarantee financing, but risk compensation is more effective than premium subsidy. Whether under the same subsidy rate or the same budget, risk compensation yields higher firm profit than premium subsidy. By contrast, the relative advantage of the two policies in terms of CGI profit and the total profit of the firm and the CGI depends on the firm’s default risk; premium subsidy performs better when default risk is low, whereas risk compensation performs better when default risk is high. Furthermore, under the objective of maximizing social welfare, risk compensation can usually achieve the optimal social welfare with a lower budget than premium subsidy. When the firm’s default risk is moderately high and the budget is sufficiently large, both policies can achieve optimal social welfare.