【论文信息】

Tang G, Li D. Optimal contracts for multidimensional SaaS outsourcing: screening efficiency, inducing effort, and threshold-based contract selection under hidden information[J]. Expert Systems with Applications, 2026, 312: 131323.

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2026.131323

【作者信息】

第一作者：唐国锋，博士、副教授、硕士生导师，研究方向：信息服务外包、机制设计

第二作者/通信作者：李丹，西南政法大学经济学院教师，研究方向：信息系统与运营管理、契约设计

【基金支持】

重庆市教委科学技术重点项目(KJZD-K202300804)。

【期刊简介】

《Expert Systems with Applications》（简称ESWA）创刊于1984年，中科院SCI 1区TOP期刊，JCR Q1区。

【论文摘要】

The misalignment of contracts in software-as-a-service (SaaS) outsourcing often leads to suboptimal outcomes, a risk exacerbated when the client cannot observe the provider’s true efficiency or development effort, and when service quality involves multiple, competing dimensions. To tackle this problem, we employ a principal-agent framework to analyze the joint effects of hidden provider information and hidden action within a multidimensional quality setting. Our findings show that information asymmetry distorts the provider’s effort allocation across quality attributes, requiring specific contractual adjustments for screening and incentivization. Crucially, we derive a practical threshold rule for contract selection: revenue-sharing is optimal when quality has high value intensity (significantly impacting revenue) and provider efficiency strongly amplifies effort’s effect on outcomes; time-and-materials contracts suit standardized tasks with moderate value intensity; otherwise, a fixed-price contract should be chosen. This rule offers managers a clear, evidence-based guide to match contract forms with their specific service profiles.