【论文信息】

Hao Y F, Pan N , Yang  H(通讯作者), Huang X M. Dynamic joint decisions under potential crisis in a manufacturing supply chain[J]. International Journal of General Systems(SCIE, JCR Q2,中科院SCI四区期刊), 2026. https://doi.org/10.1080/03081079.2026.2624479.

【作者信息】

第一作者：郝怡非，博士、副教授，研究方向：供应链管理；

第二作者：潘楠，博士研究生，研究方向：企业运营管理；

通讯作者：杨红，博士、教授，研究方向：旅游管理；

第四作者：黄小敏，硕士研究生，研究方向：供应链管理。

【基金支持】

重庆市自然科学基金项目(CSTB2024NSCQ-MSX0913)，重庆工商大学高层次人才科研启动项目(1855034, 1855044, 2355061),重庆工商大学科研平台项目(KFJJ2018007)。

【论文摘要】

Defective components may trigger product-harm crises that reduce product goodwill and market demand in a manufacturing supply chain. This study develops a differential game model comprising a supplier and a manufacturer, investigating how the members adjust quality and marketing investments when facing a potential product-harm crisis. A cost-sharing contract between the supply chain members is designed. The results show that the manufacturer prioritizes pre-crisis quality and marketing investment to exploit market growth opportunities under low crisis probability. Conversely, elevated crisis probability prompts the manufacturer to strategically conserve pre-crisis investment, reserving liquidity for post-crisis damage mitigation. In addition, pre-crisis quality investment reduces losses in crisis, so the supplier has an incentive to work with the manufacturer through quality investment cost sharing. However, the manufacturer's cooperation decision is governed by the crisis probability: the cost-sharing contract improves the manufacturer's profitability if and only if the crisis probability is low.