【论文信息】

Tang G, Liu X. SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Contract Design and Analysis under Asymmetric Information[J].Journalof SystemsScienceand Systems Engineering, 2025: 1-21.

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11518-025-5694-4

【作者信息】

第一作者：唐国锋，博士、副教授、硕士生导师，研究方向：信息服务外包、机制设计；

第二作者/通信作者：刘星星，2022级管理科学与工程专业硕士研究生、2025级重庆大学在读博士研究生，研究方向：信息服务外包、机制设计。

【基金支持】

重庆市教委科学技术重点项目(KJZD-K202300804);重庆市教委人文社科规划项目(23SKGH166);重庆市社科规划项目(2023NDYB68)等。

【期刊简介】

《Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering》（JSSSE）创刊于1992年，由中国系统工程学会主办，中科院SCI分区4区，JCR分区Q3，期刊为双月刊（季刊），属于非开放获取（Non-OA）期刊。

【论文摘要】

Outsourcing application services to SaaS providers introduces moral hazards due to the unobservableefforts of CSPs in data security and QoS. This study addresses the principal-agent problem stemmingfrom asymmetric information by designing outsourcing contracts for cooperative and non-cooperative cliententerprises within a“one to many”SaaS environment, with the aim of maximizing their expected utility.The study reveals that cooperative patterns align client and CSP interests by equating client revenues toCSP-provided security deposits, ensuring stability. Non-cooperative patterns, however, can lead to strategicgames where the first-mover advantage may invert, with later movers compensating, and sometimes transformingan initial advantage into a disadvantage. The decision to cooperate hinges on bargaining powerand the impact of CSP efforts on outputs, particularly in the multifaceted areas of data security and QoS.This research offers insights into managing risks from CSPs’unobservable efforts and understanding thestrategic interactions among client enterprises in SaaS outsourcing.