【论文信息】

Tang G F, Liu X X, Feng M Y. Optimizing contract strategies in software outsourcing: Analyzing information asymmetry and client participation impacts [J]. Information Sciences (重庆工商大学T2期刊). 2025, 717: 122307.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2025.122307.

【作者信息】

第一作者/通讯作者：唐国锋，博士、副教授、硕士生导师，研究方向：信息服务外包、机制设计；

第二作者：刘星星，2022级管理科学与工程专业硕士研究生、2025级重庆大学在读博士研究生，研究方向：信息服务外包、机制设计；

第三作者：封美芸，2024级国际商务专业硕士研究生，研究方向：外包机制设计。

【基金支持】

重庆市教委科学技术重点项目(KJZD-K202300804);重庆市教委人文社科规划项目(23SKGH166);重庆市社科规划项目(2023NDYB68)等。

【论文摘要】

In the highly competitive and rapidly expanding software outsourcing market, the issue of bilateral moral hazard resulting from the unverifiability of efforts between clients and developers has emerged as a prominent and challenging concern. Based on principal-agent and Nash bargaining theories, this paper meticulously designs revenue-sharing and time-and-materials contracts to not only align the interests of both parties but also effectively mitigate the potential negative impacts of bilateral moral hazard. By comprehensively analyzing the influence of client participation, along with various other factors on contract efficiency and the client’s revenue, it is revealed that under diverse conditions, the optimal contract types indeed vary significantly. Numerical analysis of a specific case shows that from the perspectives of maximizing social welfare and client revenue, the choice between revenue-sharing and time-and-materials contracts depends on factors such as client bug sensitivity and bug repair costs.